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Article
From context to text in
contractual interpretation:
Is there really a problem
with a plain meaning rule?
Yihan Goh
Abstract
Much of the contemporary scholarship on contractual interpretation is staunchly against a
textual analysis, by which a court can only depart from the plain meaning of a contract
exceptionally. It is therefore no surprise that scholars have reacted negatively to the spate of
recent cases where the English courts have re-emphasized the plain meaning of the text in
contractual interpretation. Yet one cannot help but wonder whether a textual analysis is really
so problematic when courts across the common law world have re-embraced it. Drawing from
both theoretical and comparative perspectives, this paper suggests that a focus on the text in
contractual interpretation, and the corresponding application of the plain meaning rule, is to be
welcomed and not scorned.
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Introduction
Much of the contemporary scholarship on contractual interpretation is staunchly against a
textual analysis, in which the plain meaning of the text takes centre stage. It is therefore no
surprise that scholars have reacted negatively to the spate of recent cases where the English
courts have re-emphasized the plain meaning of the text in contractual interpretation. For
example, one of the leading scholars in the field, Professor McLauchlan, remarked that Lord
Hoffmann’s legacy in promoting a more contextual analysis ‘appears in danger of being rather
more short-lived than . . . imagined’ (McLauchlan, 2015: 420). Yet one cannot help but wonder
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whether a textual analysis is really so problematic when it is not only the English courts that
have recently re-embraced it. In a revolution of sorts, the highest courts across the common law
world in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore have recently either reaffirmed or
returned to a more textual analysis. Drawing from both comparative and theoretical perspec-
tives, this paper will suggest that a focus on the text in contractual interpretation, and the
corresponding application of the plain meaning rule, is to be welcomed.
This paper will make two main points. First, through a discussion of the approaches taken by
the highest courts in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore, it will be argued that the
supposed ‘return’ to a textual analysis is more apparent than real. It will be shown that courts
have always applied some version of the plain meaning rule. As such, the proper debate to be
had is not the choice between a textual or contextual analysis, but rather the extent to which the
plain meaning rule should be applied. Secondly, having situated the proper question to ask, this
paper will argue that the courts should apply a strong version of the plain meaning rule. It will
be argued that this version of the rule is aptly justified as a permissible pragmatic policy choice
made within the imperfect apparatus of contractual interpretation. And, if it is accepted that the
strong version of the plain meaning rule is justified, this paper will then make some suggestions
to improve its continued application within the modern approach to contractual interpretation.
A renewed emphasis on the text
Retreat from contextual analysis in England
It is necessary for any paper on contractual interpretation to begin with what Lord Hoffmann
said almost 20 years ago in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building
Society (ICS).1 In a landmark restatement, Lord Hoffmann said that interpretation ‘is the
ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having
all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties’.2
While this did not represent a new direction in the interpretation of contracts,3 Lord
Hoffmann’s restatement did re-emphasize the importance of interpreting words with regard to
the overall context (Lewison, 2011: 3–4). Formally at least, the focus on context moved the law
away from a more textual analysis, under which the courts regarded the ‘natural and ordinary’
or ‘plain’ meaning of contractual words as almost conclusive.4 Indeed, because a contextual
analysis starts with the fundamental proposition that words acquire their intended meanings
from the context, courts are less likely to regard that words have any plain meaning to begin
with; the ‘natural meaning of words in one sentence may be quite unnatural in another’.5 This
has led to what Davies has termed the ‘modern approach’ of contractual interpretation, where
‘words might not mean what you think they mean’ and which ‘wreaks violence upon the
language chosen by the parties’ (Davies, 2013: 448). Consequently, it has become common to
regard the view that words have ‘absolute and constant referents’6 as ‘unhelpful’ (McMeel,
2011: 39) and as ‘fallacious’ (Carter, 2013: 365). In the immediate aftermath of ICS, courts in
England and elsewhere in the common law world adopted the contextual analysis with almost
uniform enthusiasm (a major exception is Australia: see Lewison, 2011: 5). It appeared as if the
textual analysis, together with the plain meaning rule, would be consigned to being relics of
legal history.
However, this has not been so. In a recent survey of the English decisions, McLauchlan
observes that the ICS restatement is ‘now being questioned or not applied by the courts as Lord
Hoffmann intended’ (2015: 408–409). According to McLauchlan (2015: 420), the shift from
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context to text in the UK Supreme Court began in Multi-Link Leisure Developments Ltd v
North Lanarkshire Council, where Lord Hope said that the court’s task in contractual inter-
pretation ‘is to ascertain the intention of the parties by examining the words they used and
giving them their ordinary meaning in their contractual context’.7 While Lord Hope’s reference
to the ‘contractual context’ might suggest that the contextual analysis still operates, it is clear
from the overall tenor of his Lordship’s speech that there is a renewed emphasis on the text,
especially as he imposed a precondition of finding an ‘ambiguity’ before any syntactical
arrangement can take place.8 The need for such a precondition refocused attention on the plain
meaning of the text as a starting point, since that will be the default meaning in the absence of
any ambiguity.
The shift to the text continued hesitantly with Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank.9 Lord Clarke
commenced his analysis of the relevant principles in agreement with the ICS restatement, and
repeated Lord Hoffmann’s exaltation that the relevant reasonable person in the interpretative
exercise is one with all the relevant background knowledge.10 This is an unmistakable allusion
to the importance of context (McLauchlan, 2015: 423). However, his Lordship also said that
‘[w]here parties have used unambiguous language, the court must apply it’.11 This, in contrast,
is a decidedly textual analysis that implies a precondition of ambiguity before a more con-
textual analysis can be undertaken. The inconsistency in Lord Clarke’s analysis led Davies to
question whether much weight should be placed on it (2012: 27). However, even then, it had
become apparent to Davies that the UK Supreme Court was ‘quietly drifting away’ from the
contextual analysis (2012: 27). McLauchlan is more certain that Lord Clarke’s statements in
Rainy Sky are inconsistent with the ICS restatement, although he also highlights that his
Lordship’s confusing terminology made it unclear whether the plain meaning rule was in fact
adopted (2015: 425). Adodo goes a step further and thinks that Lord Clarke’s pronouncements
profess the ‘continuing existence of the natural and ordinary meaning rule’ (2013: 538). Be that
as it may, it is clear that Rainy Sky represented yet another movement towards the textual
analysis.
The next key point came in Marley v Rawlings, a surprising case given that it con-
cerned the interpretation of a will, not contracts. Nonetheless, its importance can be
attributed to Lord Neuberger’s citation—with apparent approval—of Sir Richard Buxton’s
article (2010) that questioned Lord Hoffmann’s approach to interpretation in ICS and
Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd.12 Sir Richard had objected to Lord Hoffmann’s
view in ICS that the meaning of the document is not the meaning of its words. Instead, Sir
Richard was of the view that a document ‘can only speak through the words used in it’,
and that this is the ‘whole point of drawing up a document’ such as a contract (Buxton,
2010: 255–256). This again re-emphasizes the importance of the text, and echoes the
pragmatic concerns of commercial men that ‘words mean what they say in ordinary
English’ (Staughton, 1999: 310). It ought nevertheless be emphasized that Lord Neuberger
was not all too clear in Marley v Rawlings as to his endorsement of Sir Richard’s critique
of the ICS restatement.
However, what Lord Neuberger did not explicitly say in Marley v Rawlings, his Lordship
did say in Arnold v Britton.13 Arnold involved the interpretation of service charge contribution
clauses in relation to the leases of chalets. The landlord advanced an interpretation by which the
initial service charge of £90 per annum was compounded by 10% every three years. This would
have given rise to what the lessees called an ‘increasingly absurdly high annual service charge
in the later years of each of the 25 leases’.14 Eventually, the landlord prevailed as the language
of the clauses was regarded by the Supreme Court to be clear and unambiguous and thus to be
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given effect to. More significant than the result reached was Lord Neuberger’s own restatement
of the principles of contractual interpretation, consisting of ‘seven factors’ as follows:15
First, the reliance placed in some cases on commercial common sense and surrounding circum-
stances (eg in Chartbrook, paras 16–26) should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the
language of the provision which is to be construed. . . .
Secondly, when it comes to considering the centrally relevant words to be interpreted, I accept
that the less clear they are, or, to put it another way, the worse their drafting, the more ready the
court can properly be to depart from their natural meaning . . .The third point I should mention is
that commercial common sense is not to be invoked retrospectively. The mere fact that a con-
tractual arrangement, if interpreted according to its natural language, has worked out badly, or even
disastrously, for one of the parties is not a reason for departing from the natural language . . . Fourthly,
while commercial common sense is a very important factor to take into account when interpreting a
contract, a court should be very slow to reject the natural meaning of a provision as correct simply
because it appears to be a very imprudent term for one of the parties to have agreed, even ignoring the
benefit of wisdom of hindsight . . .The fifth point concerns the facts known to the parties.
When interpreting a contractual provision, one can only take into account facts or circumstances
which existed at the time that the contract was made, and which were known or reasonably available
to both parties . . .
Sixthly, in some cases, an event subsequently occurs which was plainly not intended or con-
templated by the parties, judging from the language of their contract. In such a case, if it is clear
what the parties would have intended, the court will give effect to that intention . . .
Seventhly, reference was made in argument to service charge clauses being construed ‘restric-
tively’. I am unconvinced by the notion that service charge clauses are to be subject to any special
rule of interpretation . . .
A clear theme running through those factors is a re-emphasis on the text and, quite plausibly, a
return to some kind of plain meaning rule. Indeed, the explicit emphasis on the ‘natural
meaning’ of words is clear in the second and third factors. The second factor emphasized that
the less clear the contractual words are, the ‘more ready the court can properly be to depart from
their natural meaning’.16 The third factor provided that although a contractual arrangement, ‘if
interpreted according to its natural language’, is unfavourable to one of the parties, the courts
should not for this sole reason depart ‘from the natural language’.17 The reference to ‘natural
language’ clearly assumes that words have a plain meaning, which the courts cannot depart
from unless there is ambiguity. In fact, that Lord Neuberger intended to return to a textual
analysis is evident from the very first factor, which is that the meaning of a contractual
provision is ‘most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision’.18 Taken
collectively, it is clear that recent English case law on contractual interpretation has, formally
at least, returned to a more ‘conservative’ (McLauchlan, 2015: 438) approach, which focuses
on the text and accords with a plain meaning rule.
Similar occurrences in other common law jurisdictions
The shift from context to text is not peculiar to English law. In New Zealand, one of the earliest
cases to embrace the ICS restatement was the Wellington Court of Appeal decision of Boat
Park Ltd v Hutchinson,19 where Thomas J rejected the textual analysis as ‘an outdated
approach to contractual interpretation’.20 However, the New Zealand Supreme Court has more
recently in Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd21 adopted a greater role for the
plain meaning of words as a starting point for interpretation (Havelock, 2015). The case
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concerned the interpretation of a clause in an insurance policy that had become the subject of a
claim following an earthquake in Christchurch. The question was whether the insurer’s liability
was restricted to the difference between the statutory compensation and the sum insured,
pursuant to the clause which provided that such liability was ‘limited to the amount of loss in
excess of the Natural Disaster Damage cover’. The majority of the Supreme Court found that
the insurer’s liability was indeed so restricted, based on a reading of the contract in its proper
context. Although Arnold J, writing for the majority, referred with agreement to the ICS
restatement, there are aspects of his judgment that in fact departed from it. For instance, his
Honour stated that the text ‘remains centrally important’ in the interpretative process. Thus, if
the contractual clause, ‘construed in the context of the contract as a whole, has an ordinary and
natural meaning, that will be a powerful, albeit not conclusive, indicator of what the parties
meant’.22 This is a formal return to a plain meaning rule, inasmuch as it presupposes that words
can have an ‘ordinary and natural meaning’. It is true that Arnold J does not go so far as to say
that the plain meaning can never be departed from, but his Honour seems to suggest that it
would take a lot, presumably the finding of ambiguity or absurdity, before the ‘powerful’
presumption of the parties’ intention can be displaced.
A similar shift can be observed in Singapore. The Singapore Court of Appeal in Zurich
Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd had char-
acterized the ICS restatement as a ‘watershed, representing a decisive endorsement of the
modern approach’.23 Although the law of contractual interpretation in Singapore is indirectly
affected by the more limited set of extrinsic evidence admissible by its Evidence Act (see Goh,
2013), the court embraced the contextual analysis within the confines of the Act. The court held
that the contextual analysis was compatible with the Evidence Act, and that ambiguity is not a
prerequisite for the consideration of the context in the interpretation of contracts.24 However,
barely a few years later, the same court, albeit with a different composition of judges, retreated
from the enthusiastic acceptance of the contextual analysis in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL
Holdings Pte Ltd.25 Although the court accepted the usefulness of the contextual analysis, it
also cautioned against the lack of ‘evidentiary discipline and procedural rigour’ in the
admission of extrinsic evidence.26 The enthusiasm for the contextual analysis had waned.
Subsequently, in YES F&B Group Pte Ltd v Soup Restaurant Singapore Pte Ltd, the court held
that ‘although the relevant context is also important, the text ought always to be the first port of
call for the court’.27 And a bit earlier in its judgment, the court also said that it is ‘not
inconceivable that the text itself might be plain and unambiguous inasmuch as it admits of one
clear meaning’.28 Although the court did not, similar with Arnold J’s approach in Firm PI 1
Ltd, regard the plain meaning to be absolutely conclusive, the significance of its analysis is that
Singapore law formally acknowledges that words do have a plain meaning, which forms the
starting point for analysis.
In Australia and Canada, the highest courts have cited the ICS restatement but not fully
embraced it. Their rulings instead subscribe to a plain meaning rule. Thus, the High Court of
Australia has always taken a ‘more cautious’ view of the ICS restatement (Lewison, 2011: 5;
see also McLauchlan, 2009). Before ICSwas decided, Mason J in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd
v State Rail Authority (NSW) held that the ‘true rule’ is that contextual evidence is only
admissible to interpret a contract if its words are ambiguous.29 This clearly calls for a textual
analysis and recognizes a plain meaning rule. This approach has held true through time, even
though the lower courts, which had begun to allow contextual evidence even in the absence of
ambiguity, had to be reminded by the High Court in Western Export Services Inc v Jireh
International Pty Ltd30 to apply the approach in Codelfa until it was overruled. More recently,
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the prevailing approach in Australia might be described as ‘uncertain’. In Electricity Gener-
ation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd, a majority of the High Court said that the meaning
of a contract should be ascertained by what ‘a reasonable businessperson would have under-
stood those terms to mean’,31 but made no reference to the prevailing requirement of ambi-
guity, rendering the law unclear. More recently, French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ in Mount
Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd32 repeated the direction in Electricity
Generation but also said that the process of interpretation is ordinarily ‘possible by reference to
the contract alone’.33 Thus, evidence of surrounding circumstances cannot be admitted to
contradict the plain meaning of the contractual words, if those words are ‘unambiguous or
susceptible of only one meaning’.34 The other members of the court also accepted that Mason
J’s approach continued to apply, but said that the refusal to grant special leave to appeal in
Western Export Services should not be taken to have reaffirmed that approach by way of a fresh
precedent.35 This may suggest that there is some willingness to consider the need for ambiguity
at the next clear opportunity (Ashurst LLP, 2015). Until then, Australian law seems to adopt a
more textual analysis.
Although the Canadian Supreme Court in Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp36 cited
the ICS restatement with apparent approval for the very first time, it is less clear whether it fully
adopted it. Before Sattva, the leading case on contractual interpretation in Canada was Eli Lily
& Co v Novopharm Ltd.37 The court explained that if the contractual language was ‘clear and
unambiguous on its face’, it would be ‘unnecessary to consider any extrinsic evidence’.38 Eli
Lily was taken to have laid down the principle that ambiguity was a precondition before further
extrinsic evidence is admissible to depart from the plain meaning of the text. This position was
retreated from in Sattva, where the court explained that ‘words alone do not have an immutable
or absolute meaning’.39 However, the court also said that the decision-maker must, after
reading the contract as a whole, give the words used ‘their ordinary and grammatical meaning’,
albeit ‘consistent with the surrounding circumstances’.40 The court’s reference to ‘ordinary’
meaning is probably not meant to contradict its view that words do not have ‘immutable or
absolute’ meanings. It is more likely that the court was referring to the ‘conventional’ meaning
of words. However, when discussing the surrounding circumstances that can be considered, the
court appeared to return to the importance of the text. It said that the interpretation of a written
contractual provision ‘must always be grounded in the text and read in light of the entire
contract’, and that courts cannot use surrounding circumstances to ‘deviate from the text such
that the court effectively creates a new agreement’.41
It is clear from the above discussion that there has been a formal retreat from the contextual
analysis not only in England, but also in New Zealand and Singapore. In Australia, there have
been repeated reaffirmations of the textual analysis even to the present day. Finally, although
the Canadian Supreme Court accepted the ICS restatement belatedly in 2014, the court placed
some importance on the text such that its embrace of ICS may not be total. The commonality
between all of the judicial approaches discussed above is the formal return to (or affirmation of)
a more textual analysis and the concurrent acceptance of the possibility that words can have a
plain or fixed meaning. This almost uniform shift in the judicial approach towards contractual
interpretation in multiple jurisdictions requires a fresh reconsideration of whether a return to a
more textual analysis is desirable. The manner of this reconsideration is important. As men-
tioned earlier, much of the contemporary scholarship is against a textual analysis as opposed to
a contextual analysis. This in turn presupposes that there is a stark distinction between these
two analyses. However, as will now be shown, there is in fact a great degree of overlap between
the textual and contextual analyses. They are not two different methods of contractual
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interpretation. Rather, they are different in the emphasis they each give to the plain meaning of
words. The modern approach to contractual interpretation certainly does not ignore the plain
meaning rule completely.
Modern contractual interpretation and the plain meaning rule
The origins and purposes of the plain meaning rule
In order to understand the relevance of the plain meaning rule in the modern approach to
contractual interpretation, it is necessary to sketch out the historical origin and purposes behind
the rule. In the first place, Sullivan explains that ‘plain meaning’ is the meaning that a com-
petent user of language would understand by reading the words in their immediate context
(1994: 8–9). Coˆte´ similarly describes a plain meaning as one that a normal reading would not
dispute or regard as controversial (1992: 240).
From this starting point, it was the emphasis on the document and the finality of the text that
gave rise to the plain meaning rule in contractual interpretation. Writers differ on the origins of
a rule that attached fidelity to the written word, but Perillo suggests that it originated as a result
of the Protestant Reformation in sixteenth-century Britain (Perillo, 2000: 435). Powell explains
that there was a ‘cultural rejection’ of interpretation, captured by the Reformers’ slogan of ‘sola
Scriptura’ (Scripture only) (1985: 889). Invoking obedience to the Bible, Protestants believed
that the literal meaning of the text was the only safe way of understanding Scripture (1985:
889). Any ‘human invention’ beyond the text was therefore corruptive of the text’s meaning
(1985: 890). The debate on the interpretation of Scripture easily affected the interpretation of
legal texts. Puritans argued in the seventeenth century that, while the Bible could be understood
on its own terms because it was clear to the normal reader, the same could not said of legal
texts, which were usually crafted in obscure language (1985: 891). There were thus calls for the
law to be drafted in clear and certain words that could not be manipulated by judges through the
use of ‘judicial construction’ (1985: 891).
Although the Puritan attack on traditional legal hermeneutics did not succeed in Britain, it
did not detract from the belief then that words could be understood on their own terms, without
any external context. With this background, the plain meaning rule originally surfaced in
statutory interpretation (Mawakana, 2011: 45). It was explained in the case of Sussex Peerage
that ‘if the words of the Statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can
be necessary than to expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense’.42 The rule sur-
faced in contractual interpretation shortly thereafter, ostensibly to control faulty memory and
dishonesty.43 Perillo suggests that the plain meaning rule developed in contractual inter-
pretation because pre-nineteenth century common law presumed that sealed instruments were
the best evidence of parties’ intentions to be bound (2000: 432). Yet other writers suggest that
the rule grew out of a ‘concerted effort’ by jurists ‘to remake the common law for purposes of a
grand theory of contract, which would accommodate free-market capitalism during the
industrial revolution’ (Goldstein, 2013: 84–85). Whichever is the true historical account, it has
rightly been pointed out that the plain meaning rule was used by formalists to further the
objective determination of parties’ intentions (Goldstein, 2013: 84–85).
The different versions of the plain meaning rule
Although the purpose of the plain meaning rule is clear, this only takes us so far. In particular,
how does the rule further its purpose of furthering objectivity? This question is difficult to
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answer because the content of the rule has never been comprehensively defined. At its simplest,
the idea behind the rule is that the plain or natural/ordinary meaning of words cannot be
departed from. But a moment’s thought reveals several possible understandings of the rule. For
example, what does it mean to ‘depart’ from the plain meaning? Are there really no situations
where the plain meaning can be departed from? Indeed, a closer examination of the cases and
academic commentaries reveal a few versions of the plain meaning rule, which we will term the
‘very strong version’, ‘strong version’ and ‘weak version’ respectively.
The very strong version of the rule posits that ‘words are symbols with fixed meanings, and
parties to a writing should be held to that meaning, regardless of whether it coincides with their
intention’ (Snow, 1987: 685). By this version, words have a fixed meaning that must be given
effect to. For example, in Holt & Co v Collyer,44 Fry J regarded that the word ‘beerhouse’
should have a fixed meaning. He said that it was ‘important to the public that the meaning of the
word ‘‘beerhouse’’ should be ascertained once for all, because then persons who have to draw
instruments relating to businesses of this sort will know on what principle to proceed’.45
Another example is the expression ‘consequential loss’ in exclusion clauses. As Professor
Carter has accurately summarized, there are two views on the meaning of this expression. First,
the English cases provide that ‘consequential loss’ refers to loss that, in the absence of the
exclusion clause, is recoverable under the second limb of theHadley v Baxendale46 test (Carter,
2009). Secondly,McGregor on Damages suggests that ‘consequential loss’ refers to loss that is
not a ‘normal loss’.47 Both views assume that the expression ‘consequential loss’ has a fixed
meaning that can be applied consistently in every case.
Moving down one level, the strong version of the rule provides that the plain meaning can be
departed from, but extrinsic evidence to effect such departure can only be considered if certain
preconditions are satisfied. One usual precondition is that the writing or term in question is
‘ambiguous’ on its face. This is illustrated by Mason J’s insistence in Codelfa that contextual
evidence is only admissible to interpret a contract if its words are ambiguous. If not, the plain
meaning of the words must be applied.48 According to this view, the court is expected to assess
whether there is an ambiguity by examining the text alone without recourse to anything outside
of the contract. Yet another precondition for admitting extrinsic evidence to contradict the plain
meaning is if that meaning, in the words of Lord Blackburn in River Wear Commissioners v
Adamson, produces ‘an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince
the Court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification’.49
Again, the court is expected to come to this conclusion simply by looking at the contractual
words only. Under the strong version of the plain meaning rule, plain meaning ‘exists as a
strong concept largely free of contextual influences’ (Perell, 1998: 48). The consequences of
ambiguity or absurdity only have a limited effect on the interpretation of the contractual
language since the first port of call is the language alone. Indeed, the difficulty here is that the
court cannot consider extrinsic evidence in deciding whether the contractual words are
ambiguous or lead to an absurdity. This, together with the absence of guidelines to decide if
there is in fact ambiguity or absurdity, make it difficult for the courts to find that the plain
meaning can in fact be departed from (Snow, 1987: 685).
Finally, the weak version of the rule similarly allows departure from the plain meaning on
the satisfaction of certain preconditions but, unlike the strong version, allows for the consid-
eration of extrinsic evidence to decide if those preconditions are satisfied. Thus, apart from the
contractual language, a court is permitted to look at the context to assess whether those words,
read in that context, give rise to either ambiguity or absurdity. Indeed, if extrinsic evidence is
considered in this manner, the plain meaning rule merely affects the weight of the evidence
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(McLauchlan, 1996: 100). This is because if extrinsic evidence is routinely admitted to con-
sider whether the plain meaning gives rise to an ambiguity, then the plain meaning merely
establishes a rather weak rebuttable presumption that that was the meaning adopted by the
parties.50 Thus, as compared with the very strong and strong versions of the plain meaning rule,
the plain meaning is less absolute here, and more readily gives way to ‘context, purpose and
consequences’ as being ‘more integral and more influential’ (Perell, 1998: 48). It has been
explained that this is effectively a contextual analysis (Goldstein, 2013: 96), but, even here, the
context does not deny that words can have a ‘determinate grammatical and ordinary sense’
(Perell, 1998: 48).
The strong and weak versions of the plain meaning rule in modern
contractual interpretation
Although the modern approach in contractual interpretation calls for a ‘contextual’ analysis,
this is not done to the complete exclusion of the plain meaning rule. It is suggested that courts in
fact apply some version of the plain meaning rule, specifically the strong and weak versions. At
the outset, it is perhaps simpler to discuss what the modern approach is not about. We can first
rule out the possibility of the modern approach being an entirely contextual approach, or based
on what has been called a ‘sceptical’ view of meaning. By this view, words do not have default
or conventional meanings (Carter, 2013: 364). There is simply no starting point to meaning.
Perell explains that sceptical arguments founded on epistemology or the philosophy of lan-
guage postulate that there is no such concept as a plain meaning because language is inherently
indeterminate (1998: 31). Language is therefore really a matter of ‘unconstrainable inter-
pretation’ (Carter, 2013: 364) that is wholly determined by the interpreter and not by language
or words. Some critics go even further and suggest that the ‘plain meaning’ of a word will never
be objective, since each interpreter brings a different perspective that will interact with the text,
rendering a different interpretation each time (Scallen, 1995: 1746–1747). Put another way,
there is substituted for the ‘plain meaning’ the indeterminacy of the interpreter’s own intentions
and purposes.
Such an extreme view of language has not gained currency in either the cases or academic
commentaries in the jurisdictions discussed above. The plain or natural and ordinary meaning
of words is still emphasized in the modern ‘contextual’ analysis. In so far as cases are con-
cerned, it is unlikely that Lord Hoffmann subscribed to a sceptical view of language when he
said in Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan that ‘the notion of words having a natural meaning
is not a very helpful one’.51 This is because his Lordship later said in ICS that words can have a
presumptive meaning to begin with. Moreover, the recent shift from context to text has only
fortified the plain meaning of words. Thus, in Firm PI 1 Ltd, the New Zealand Supreme Court
regarded the plain meaning as only a ‘powerful, albeit not conclusive, indicator of what the
parties meant’.52 This is likewise the position under English law after Arnold, inasmuch as
the UK Supreme Court emphasized the plain meaning of the text as a starting point. This is all
the more so in Australia, where Codelfa still applies. The result is that the modern contextual
approach, far from regarding context as determinative, takes the plain meaning of contractual
words into account in the interpretative exercise. In line with Lord Mustill’s view in Charter
Reinsurance that ‘most expressions do have a natural meaning, in the sense of their primary
meaning in ordinary speech’,53 the modern contractual approach does not deny that the
meaning of words have a natural starting point that is otherwise known as their ‘plain meaning’.
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Also, although some commentators suggest that meaning is a ‘relative concept’, they should
not be taken to mean that words do not have default or conventional meanings (Carter, 2013:
364). First of all, these commentators also accept that ‘judicial decisions may create pre-
sumptions about the meanings of words’ (Carter, 2013: 365). Indeed, as McLauchlan has said,
‘[t]o deny the existence of a plain meaning rule by virtue of which parties may be bound to a
contract in accordance with a meaning which neither of them gave to it is not to deny the
existence or relevance of ‘‘plain’’ meanings’ (1996: 87). Professor McMeel, another prominent
scholar in the field, similarly accepts that it is possible to speak of the ‘conventional’ or
‘common sense’ meaning of words, while insisting that the context is always relevant in
selecting which conventional meaning best accords with the parties’ intentions (2011: 39).
These commentators therefore acknowledge that words do have conventional meanings as
starting points for interpretation, which may, however, be contradicted by the extrinsic evi-
dence. Where these commentators part company with the plain meaning rule is whether and to
what extent that plain meaning can be departed from. Notwithstanding this, there is no indi-
cation that their objection of the plain meaning rule is founded on any sceptical view of lan-
guage itself. The most that can be said is that critics of the plain meaning rule outside of the
United States are mild sceptics, who believe that meaning is ‘transitionally possible but rela-
tively unverifiable’ (Perell, 1998: 37). On this milder view, there is no objection to words
having a plain meaning to begin with, but that the meaning can change depending on the
context.
The second thing that the modern approach is not about is the very strong version of the
plain meaning rule. Courts and commentators do not disregard the relevance of the plain
meaning, nor do they treat it as the absolute determinant of meaning. It would be hard put to
find a modern court or commentator advocating that the plain meanings of words are absolute
and can never be departed from. This much is clear from the ICS principles, which stress the
importance of the context in interpretation. Indeed, Lord Hoffmann, the author of the influ-
ential ICS restatement, pointed out in BCCI v Ali that ‘the primary source of understanding
what the parties meant is their language interpreted in accordance with conventional lan-
guage’.54 The reference to ‘conventional language’ is a reference to context, albeit in a more
limited sense. But it is clear that Lord Hoffmann did not intend context to be so restricted; his
Lordship said in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd that ‘there is not . . . a limit to the
amount of red-ink or verbal rearrangement or correction which the court is allowed’ in con-
tractual interpretation pursuant to the context.55 Even in Australia, where Codelfa applies to
stress the importance of the plain meaning, McHugh JA has observed in Manufacturer’s
Mutual Insurance Ltd v Withers that because it is rarely possible to know what a word means
without recourse to the surrounding circumstances, contextual evidence will generally be
admissible ‘if it is known to both parties or sufficiently notorious to be presumed to be within
their knowledge’.56
Thus far we have seen that the modern approach in contractual interpretation is not about a
complete disregard of either the plain meaning or context. The truth, as with many things, is in
between. Put one way, the courts differ in the extent to which they consider the context (Ricks,
2008: 785). Thus, some cases consider a more restrained extent of context; in these cases,
judges bring to a text ‘all their internalized rules for common usage—rules of grammar, syntax,
etc—through which they interpret the contract’ (Goldstein, 2013: 109–110). The High Court of
Australia in Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd emphasized this approach by
alluding to the need to construe a clause ‘according to its natural and ordinary meaning, read in
the light of the contract as a whole, thereby giving due weight to the context in which the clause
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appears including the nature and object of the contract’.57 The approach here is thus to consider
the context as a necessary, if limited, part of the contractual interpretative exercise, but without
ignoring that plain meaning remains possible and, indeed, necessary (Perell, 1998: 58).
Similarly, Carnwath LJ stated in ING Bank NV v Ros Roca SA58 his preference for an inter-
pretation that ‘does significantly less violence to the language of the clause’. This is effectively
the strong version of the plain meaning rule, where courts place more emphasis on the plain
meaning as compared to the context. This may be contrasted to how some courts place a greater
emphasis on the context. This can be seen in, for example, ICS, which concerned the inter-
pretation of the following clause that excluded certain claims made against West Bromwich:
Any claim (whether sounding in rescission for undue influence or otherwise) that you [the inves-
tors] have or may have against the West Bromwich Building Society in which you claim an
abatement of the sums which you would otherwise have to repay to the Society . . .
Although the House of Lords accepted that the obvious plain meaning of the clause meant that
ICS could not sue West Bromwich, a majority of their Lordships felt able to interpret the clause
to mean otherwise in light of the context (Davies, 2013: 435). This was thus an approach that
paid greater heed to the context in the interpretative exercise or, as was discussed above, the
weak version of the plain meaning rule.
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the courts consider both the plain meaning and
context in interpretation. Specifically, they apply both a strong and weak version of the plain
meaning rule in contractual interpretation. This is an important point because then the correct
question to ask is not whether the courts should prefer a ‘textual’ analysis over a ‘contextual’
analysis, but rather how the courts should balance the interplay between plain meaning and
context. The recent shift in contractual interpretation across the common law world can thus be
more properly viewed as the courts’ return to a greater emphasis on the plain meaning as the
starting point of analysis, rather than the stark acceptance of text in place of context. Two issues
arise in connection with this characterization. First, is the reliance on plain meaning ever
justified in light of the widely accepted view that context is fundamental in contractual
interpretation? Secondly, if it is justified, what is the proper balance to be drawn between plain
meaning and context? In particular, should the courts apply a strong or weak version of the
plain meaning rule?
Justifying recourse to plain meaning generally
The real objection against ‘plain meaning’ generally
Any justification of the recourse to plain meaning, to whatever extent, requires the proper
identification of the real objection against such meaning generally. Commentators have raised
concerns against the plain meaning on the basis that by looking to such meaning, contractual
interpretation is returning to a ‘more conservative approach’, where disputes are ‘resolved
primarily on the basis of textual analysis’ (McLauchlan, 2015: 438). This, as discussed above,
should not be taken to be a linguistic objection on the basis that the meaning of words can never
have a starting point. Rather, the objection really is with when that plain meaning can be
departed from. In particular, these commentators disagree on the set of prerequisites imposed
by the courts based on ambiguity/absurdity that dictate when the plain meaning can be departed
from. The better choice for these commentators, it seems, is for the plain meaning to be
considered together with an unrestrained set of context at the outset.
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Because this objection is generally concerned with the accuracy of the final interpretation, it
may be termed the ‘accuracy objection’. The accuracy objection is premised on the notion that
meaning ultimately depends upon context. Hence to exclude or restrict the context is to render
the interpretation inaccurate. McLauchlan puts this clearly when he says that ‘[t]he truth is that
no words have a fixed or settled meaning’ and that ‘[r]ather it is some person who gives a
meaning to them’ (1996: 84). Professor Williams made the point much earlier (1945: 384)
when he said that:
Apart from such ordinary or assigned meanings words have no ‘actual’, ‘correct’, ‘essential’,
‘grammatical’, ‘legitimate’, ‘literal’, ‘natural’, ‘necessary’, ‘rational’, ‘real’, or ‘reasonable’ mean-
ing (all of which adjectives are common in legal literature).
The great American judge, Holmes J, made the same point judicially by saying that ‘[a] word is
not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly
in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used’.59
Contractual interpretation is about choices
The problem with the accuracy objection is that it ignores the fact that contractual inter-
pretation is really about choices. These choices need to be made because there is no perfect way
of ascertaining the parties’ actual intention through the interpretative exercise. Thus, choices
are made to get at the best, if imperfect, way of doing that, balanced by concerns of certainty
and efficiency. To begin with, contractual interpretation is concerned with an objective
ascertainment of the parties’ intention. Indeed, objectivity has been described as ‘the corner-
stone of the theory of contract and permeates our entire approach to contractual interpreta-
tion’.60 However, it is not immediately obvious that the ascertainment of the parties’ intentions
can only or should be done objectively. This is because, as Powell points out, the Latin
equivalent of the word ‘intent’ (intentio) admits of two meanings in medieval usage: it could
refer to ‘the meaning the drafters wished to communicate’ or ‘the meaning the reader was
warranted in deriving from the text’ (1985: 895). In choosing the latter meaning, the common
law committed itself to the belief that the parties’ intentions are to be determined from their
words and conduct, not their unexpressed intentions.61 Thus, Lord Hoffmann alluded to the
futility of any other approach, writing extra-judicially that the courts ‘have no direct access to
[the parties’] subjective mental states’ (1998: 660). By this approach, even subjective evidence
of conformity ‘to an intention common to both or all the parties . . . [which] violates the usage of
all other persons’62 cannot be considered. This was aptly demonstrated by Lord Hoffmann’s
disapproval of The Karen Oltman63 in Chartbrook; in his Lordship’s view, Kerr J’s consid-
eration of evidence of the parties’ agreed meaning was an ‘illegitimate extension’ of the rule
that a particular trade or community has its own peculiar linguistic usage.64
Despite the numerous recent cases that have emphasized the objectivity of contractual
interpretation, it must not be thought that objectivity is a recent development of the common
law of contract. Except for a short experimentation with the subjective approach in the mid-
nineteenth century, the common law of contract interpretation has always been objective
(Perillo, 2000: 432). In an early sixteenth century text, Doctor and Student, a common law
student describes the then-prevailing approach toward contracts as ‘the intent inward in the
heart, man’s law cannot judge’, and that a promise would bind if there is a ‘charge by reason of
the promise’ (Germain, 1988: 179). Similarly, John Joseph Powell’s treatise on contract law in
the eighteenth century stated that the law of contract is not concerned with ‘internal sentiments’
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but only ‘external expression’ (1790: 372–373). The focus was on the objective meaning of the
promise, as manifested in writing, rather than the unexpressed subjective intentions of the
parties. There were—and continue to be—cogent policy reasons for this approach, founded on
the need for certainty as contained in the written word. Thus, in Throckmerton v Tracy, Brook
CJ explained that to give effect to the parties’ meaning instead of the words would ‘introduce
barbarousness and ignorance, and to destroy all learning and diligence’.65 In more contem-
porary language, McMeel explains that this approach enables commercial parties to act upon
the expressed intentions of other parties, without needing to be concerned about any intention
that was not communicated (2011: 36). Another rationale McMeel advances is that the
objectivity approach frees the courts from the ‘time-consuming and potentially fruitless task’ of
ascertaining the parties’ actual intentions (2011: 36).
The modern objective approach had become the undeniable truth in the twentieth century.
The choice of an objective approach over a subjective one is a compromise, for, as Kramer puts
it, ‘the best that the interpreter can hope for is to discover the apparently intended meaning of
the communicator’ (2003: 176). Without telepathy, the interpretation is ‘no less a pragmatic
process involving presumptions and hypotheses’ and ‘guesswork built upon the assumption
that the utterance is a rational means to an end’ (Kramer, 2003: 176). However, the need to
make choices does not end with the undisputed commitment66 to the objective principle.
Objectivity must be given effect to by further choices. Historically, formalism was chosen as
the way to ascertain the parties’ intentions. The parol evidence rule and the plain meaning rule
were then chosen to give effect to formalism, by focusing on the document, and the textual
meaning of words. The existence of choices means that there is no one right answer in how
contracts are to be interpreted. Ultimately, the method of interpretation employed is a choice.
And the correctness of that choice needs to be evaluated based on the consistency between the
reasons behind secondary choices and primary choices. Thus, if the underlying rationale
behind the primary choice of objectivity is certainty and efficiency, then it might be of concern
if subsequent, secondary choices as to how that objectivity is to be manifested are made on
inconsistent bases.
Recourse to plain meaning justified as a pragmatic choice
Contemporary discussions of contractual interpretation seldom ever discuss the existence of
these choices, much less evaluate the desirability of elements of contractual interpretation with
them in mind. For example, the accuracy objection may not accord with the more policy-
oriented reasons for preferring an objective principle in the first place. Indeed, if imperfect
meaning is accepted as matter of policy in choosing objectivity, then should not inaccuracy
through the use of plain meaning be similarly accepted? The plain meaning rule is ultimately a
choice taken in the light of the contractual interpretation framework as a whole. There is
undoubtedly some artificiality in the entire exercise, but this is necessary for the following
policy reasons.
First of all, an emphasis on the plain meaning as a starting point is simply necessary for
communication to work in the real world. In Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd, a defamation case,
Diplock LJ acknowledged that it is artificial to assume that there is only one correct meaning to
words when reasonable people recognize that words are not precise for communicating the
thoughts of one man to another.67 Yet, his Lordship also recognized the practical need for the
attribution of a ‘right’ meaning to words so that they can be used to define legal rights and
duties. Similarly, as Calnan observes, the view that words have plain meanings ‘finds its roots
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in pragmatism and experience’ (2013: 70). The assumption, which is a sound one, is that most
interpreters will share a common vocabulary so that any major discrepancy is avoided. Plain
meaning rests on our ‘unreflective, public, conventional practice of language use’ (Ricks, 2008:
769). For communication to work, meaning has to be based on ‘public and shared conventions’
and the ‘consistent, conventional patterns of our usage’ (Ricks, 2008: 784). It is always possible
to assign meaning to words in a contract using the text of the contract and the limited context
under the plain meaning rule (Goldstein, 2013: 110). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine language
working apart from such shared conventions being utilized in interpretation. Thus, while it may
accord with theory that the meaning of words can only ever be contextual, the practical, if
‘untheoretical’ solution, is to acknowledge that ‘most words are pretty easy to understand in the
context of the few words which surround them’ (Calnan, 2013: 70).
Secondly, recourse to the plain meaning promotes certainty. It is clear that some application
of a plain meaning rule offers a ‘certainty of writing’ that is absent when extrinsic evidence is
admitted without regard to the text as a starting point (Johnson, 2005: 671). Such a starting
point would bind the parties to the language of the contract that the court has deemed to be
‘plain’ (Johnson, 2005: 638). As Kirby J stated in Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v
Gardiner, courts do no service to parties by adopting ‘atextual meanings’ since that will tend to
defeat the expectations of parties who rely on the use of the English language to express their
bargains.68 Colman J similarly alludes to the importance of certainty in BP Exploration
Operating Co Ltd v Kvaerner Oilfield Products Ltd69 when he said that ‘[t]he whole basis of
contractual certainty is the words actually used in their ordinary meaning’. In contrast, an
examination of the context can undermine the parties’ ability to confirm their agreement into
writing that will be enforced by the court predictably (Goldstein, 2013: 98). This emphasis on
certainty will also avoid the ‘gamesmanship and dishonesty’ that a contextual analysis might
bring (Solan, 2001: 87–90). In essence, as Solan notes, ‘[p]rivileging the written contract serves
a useful function precisely because people really do testify dishonestly, or at least consistently
with a self-serving reality that they have created in their own minds about events underlying a
litigation’ (2001: 89–90).
Thirdly, reliance on the plain meaning is also efficient in that the courts and parties do not
need to deal with the contextual evidence, much of which may well have been admitted for
strategic, rather than accuracy, reasons. Short of a detailed empirical study confirming this, the
intuitive (and logical) thinking must be that as courts spend less time on controversial con-
tractual interpretation issues by elucidating a set of clear and consistently applied rules, appeals
from the lower courts to appellate courts will decrease over time as litigants no longer deem it
worthwhile to try and reverse the decision below. This will make courts more efficient overall.
Moreover it is not only the courts’ resources that one should be concerned about; the parties’
resources (and corresponding efficiency) also matter. As Schwartz and Scott have argued,
commercial parties will prefer courts to interpret the text of the contract alone because the costs
of drafting and litigating such contracts will be lower than using a vast array of contextual
evidence (2003: 569, 2010: 930). Not only is such a process more efficient, it is also fairer, in
the sense that if parties have chosen the language of the contract with a certain plain meaning in
mind, then they should be held to that meaning (Goldstein, 2013: 125).
Justifying shift to the strong version of the plain meaning rule
Accordingly, the allusion to some kind of plain meaning in contractual interpretation promotes
common sense, certainty and efficiency. This is really not so controversial. Indeed, as we have
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discussed above, although the modern courts may speak of a ‘contextual’ approach, the truth is
that they have never abandoned the relevance of the ‘plain meaning’. The real question is the
extent to which the courts should place on the plain meaning in contractual interpretation. What
ought to be the proper balance between plain meaning and context? It is suggested that if the
above justifications for recourse to the plain meaning are taken seriously, then it ought to be the
strong version of the plain meaning rule that the courts should adopt going forward.
Certainty is enhanced with the courts adopting the strong version of the plain meaning rule
because it avoids the parties having to guess at when a court will shift to a more ‘contextual’
interpretation. The undesirability of uncertainty is aptly demonstrated by the facts of ICS,
where the departure from the plain meaning was unexpected because the interpreted meaning
was so different from the plain meaning, which was neither ambiguous nor absurd. Although
this may have been ‘theoretically’ more faithful to the contextual meaning of words, it is
equally important to recognize that contractual interpretation has immensely practical func-
tions as well. It must be sufficiently certain not only to allow commercial parties to structure
their dealings with one another in advance, but also to discourage those same parties from
reopening a concluded deal endlessly on the basis of a difference in ‘interpretation’. What is
really needed is not perfect theoretical neatness, but practical certainty. In this regard, Davies
rightly suggests that the way forward from ICS is for there to be restraint and the avoidance of
violence to the contractual language (2013: 450). By this approach, the courts should depart
from the plain meaning only if gives rise to absurdity or is unworkable. This is a predictable set
of criteria that can guide commercial parties in structuring their deals and keeping concluded
deals closed. Rather than spend considerable resources litigating over the correct ‘meaning’ of
words that is founded on the uncertainty in the law of contractual interpretation, the law should
encourage parties to devote resources towards properly structuring their commercial
arrangements in the first place. The borderline between plain meaning and a more contextual
meaning need not be difficult to define: courts can encourage greater certainty and efficiency
by laying down a default rule that the plain meaning will be adhered to, unless ambiguity or
absurdity can be discerned from the contract as a whole.
In a similar vein, the strong version of the plain meaning rule also promotes efficiency by
defining the context that can be used in the interpretative exercise. Rather than promote the
endless search through multiple correspondence and background facts, Goldstein proposes that
courts should look at the language of the contract and the ‘publicly and conventionally’
meaning of words to determine if the contractual words are unambiguous (2013: 112). Thus,
parties will put forward extrinsic evidence to show that their proposed interpretation of the
word is relevant, and the courts will be furnished with a list of possible meanings that the word
can bear (Goldstein, 2013: 113). The context is kept artificially restricted to only the boundaries
of usage particular to the parties. Thus, where parties are in a specific trade, the courts will more
readily consider the trade usage of particular words.70 The trade usage in essence becomes the
relevant context for ascertaining the meaning of the word concerned. Such an approach is to be
encouraged as it provides a predictable framework on how extrinsic evidence is to be tendered.
Apart from the general guidance that such evidence must relate to the conventional under-
standing of the word, parties will first present to the court evidence of common usages of the
term. Then, more particular evidence of usage within a more limited segment of the public is
allowed (Goldstein, 2013: 115–116).
Ultimately, it must not be lost in the interpretative exercise that people use language to enter
into contracts to control future affairs (Goldstein, 2013: 123). Due to the circumstances in
which contracts are made, this general proposition will likely concern commercial affairs, but
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can equally apply to non-commercial situations. The parties, or a court, must in the end be able
to implement the contract. The parties should be confident that their original record of their
agreement is that which is given effect to (Goldstein, 2013: 124), instead of a meaning that is
theoretically sound but practically unreal. A court also has to have access to the shared and
conventional meaning of words and that needs to be given effect to so as to create a predictable
state of future affairs. In order to achieve these outcomes, it is suggested that the courts should
adopt the strong version of the plain meaning rule. In that regard then, the courts’ recent shift to
a more ‘conservative’ approach in contractual interpretation, in as much as that corresponds to
a shift away from a weak version to a strong version of the plain meaning rule, is to be
welcomed.
Improvements in the application of the strong version of the plain
meaning rule
However, the strong version of the plain meaning rule is not without its difficulties. The first
difficulty is not with the content of the rule itself but rather the courts’ inconsistent application
of the plain meaning rule. With the courts purporting to apply at least two versions of the plain
meaning rule, and some disavowing the utility of any plain meaning rule altogether, it is
unclear what the prevalent approach is. It is important for the courts to recognize a consistent
approach, preferably the strong version of the plain meaning rule for the reasons discussed
above. The harm from an unsettled state of law as to the approach to interpret contracts is far
greater than using either a textual or contextual analysis. If parties are unable to know in
advance what the applicable approach is, they will be unable to draft their agreements in a way
that will legally reflect their true intentions. Indeed, even if it is thought that the plain meaning
rule does not accurately reflect the parties’ intentions, the irony is that the contextual analysis
will have this effect as well, if only because it is nearly impossible to predict in advance what
the ‘contextual’ meaning will be owing to the countless body of contextual evidence potentially
available. It is therefore to be welcomed, not scorned, that the highest courts across the major
common law jurisdictions are conducing consistently towards a more textual analysis and
applying a plain meaning rule. As more courts settle on this approach, it may be that, as in
economics and business, a network effect will apply (see generally Shapiro and Varian, 1999).
When a network effect is present, the benefit that accrues is not with the precise approach being
applied, but with how many jurisdictions subscribe to a particular approach. Thus, the more
jurisdictions that use a particular method to interpret contracts, the more certain and consistent
the law will be. Parties will then know in advance how to draft their agreements with this
widespread approach in mind. The benefit of the approach, accelerated by the network effect,
lies in its widespread adoption, rather than its substantive merits.
A more specific challenge particular to the strong version of the plain meaning rule is to
recognize the mutability of language (Perell, 1998: 65). Although the strong version rests on a
definable body of meanings, it is obvious that the range of meanings of words can be varied
over time (Perell, 1998: 65). One prominent example is Queen Anne’s comment that Sir
Christopher Wren’s architecture was ‘awful, artificial, and amusing’, by which, she actually
meant that it was ‘awe-inspiring, highly artistic, and thought-provoking’ (Scalia and Garner,
2012: 78). According to Scalia and Garner, all three words used by Queen Anne have
undergone ‘pejoration’, that is, their meanings have degenerated over time to bear only neg-
ative connotations (2012: 78). This example illustrates the fundamental rule that words must be
given the plain meaning they had when the text was adopted. While there is some debate in
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constitutional and statutory interpretation whether this is the right approach, this is much more
accepted in contractual interpretation. This is because contracts are generally not expected to
endure as long as constitutions and statutes, which reduces the relevance of the need for an
‘updated’ interpretation to cater to societal needs over time. Moreover, a contract cannot bind
other parties and does not (usually) confer rights on others (Claybrook, 2006: 118). Thus, the
parties, by their agreement, fix the meaning as it is plainly or conventionally used at the time of
contracting. This is also in line with the rationale behind not admitting subsequent conduct to
interpret contracts for fear that such evidence will alter the original bargain between the
parties.71
A related challenge particular to the strong version of the plain meaning rule is to have clear
and certain default rules that apply if it becomes impossible to determine the plain meaning due
to the malleability of language (Perell, 1998: 59). This is quite different from the criteria of
ambiguity and absurdity that define when it is permissible to depart from the plain meaning. A
failure to define these default rules properly will give rise to the same problems of uncertainty
and inefficiency associated with the contextual analysis. In this regard, certain words are
simply not precise and may also define concepts that are imprecise or do not have a concrete
form (Perell, 1998: 59). In most cases, the interpretative task will be easy because it is possible
to work out the correct meaning from the possible meanings by ascertaining the underlying
formula and applying the necessary variables (Perell, 1998: 59). Where, however, the inter-
pretative task is difficult due to the inexact circumstances, or because the word’s possible
meanings are not settled, the courts will need to define the boundaries within which the correct
meaning lies, and then select one of those meanings as the correct one. The courts frequently
turn to default rules or ‘canons of interpretation’ to help defuse the ambiguity and choose one
meaning as the correct one. The use of these canons should not make interpretation ‘gratui-
tously roundabout and complex’ (Scalia and Garner, 2012: 70), but should actually help reach
the correct interpretation. The foremost canon is that words are to be understood in their
conventional meanings, unless the context provides otherwise. Context in this regard refers to
the contextual and idiomatic clues which of the several meanings a word is to bear (Scalia and
Garner, 2012: 70). Common experience tells us that a reasonable person interprets a vast
majority of words in this manner everyday. Other semantic, syntactic and contextual canons
can be applied if the immediate context fails to yield a meaning. In order that certainty is
preserved, the content and application of these canons must be consistent. The benefit is, once
again, with the consistent application of a rule, more than its substantive content.
Conclusion
It is interesting to observe the ebb and flow of contractual interpretation from the textual to the
contextual, and now from the contextual back to the textual. The very change shows that a
choice is involved in choosing the appropriate methodology. If so, it needs to be recognized that
formalist conventions such as the plain meaning rule are artificial but necessary to ensure that
contracts can be predictably and efficiently interpreted, ensuring a conducive environment for
commerce. High theory about linguistics aside, it is difficult to quarrel with the common-
sensical notion that people need conventions to communicate, and contractual interpretation is
merely a more particular example of that general principle (Goldstein, 2013: 141).
In conclusion, this paper has argued that the courts’ return to a more textual analysis, or the
adoption of the strong version of the plain meaning rule, is to be welcomed. In the first place,
the courts have never disavowed the plain or conventional meanings of words as a starting point
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in contractual interpretation, and so the correct question is not with choosing between a
‘textual’ or ‘contextual’ analysis, but with balancing the importance of plain meaning and
context. The choice of giving importance to the plain meaning of words is entirely in line with
the rationales underpinning the objectivity principle, justified on account of its certainty and
efficiency. The strong version of the plain meaning rule enhances the certainty and efficiency
brought about by recourse to the plain meaning. Looking ahead to the future, challenges to the
strong version of the plain meaning rule, such as the malleability and mutability of language,
can all be addressed by having a definite and certain set of rules in contractual interpretation. In
the final analysis, the way forward may well be a more consistently defined and applied strong
version of the plain meaning rule, rather than an ambiguous (and tedious) search for context.
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